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TAKING FROM A AND GIVING TO B: 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND 
THE CASE OF THE SHIFTING 
PARADIGM 
John V. Orth* 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government 
from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law," and the Fourteenth Amendment extends 
that prohibition to the states. State constitutions say the same 
thing, in one form of words or another. I Scholars have traced the 
phrase "due process of law" to Sir Edward Coke's seventeenth 
century commentary on Magna Carta,z in which he used the 
words, claiming a Law French original,3 to restate (and perhaps 
enlarge) the Great Charter's guarantee of freemen's rights 
against governmental invasion except per legem terre ("by the 
law of the land").4 It should be unnecessary to remark that a 
guarantee of due process is a procedural guarantee. Before a 
* ©by John V. Orth, 1997, William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, 
Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University. 
1. The earliest state constitutions used the phrase "law of the land." rather than 
"due process of law." See, e.g., Md. Canst .. Declaration of Rights,§ 21 (1776) ("no free-
man ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties. or privileges, 
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or 
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land"). Some state consti-
tutions continue that usage. See, e.g., Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. 24. Later, 
state constitutions began to follow the wording of the Federal Bill of Rights. See, e.g., 
Cal. Const. Art.!,§ 7 ("A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law ... "). 
2. Edwardo Coke, 2 Institutes of the Laws of England 50 (W. Clarke and Sons, 
1809). See Sir William Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law 61 (Methuen & Co., A.L. 
Goodhart and H.G. Hanbury, eds., 7th rev. ed. 1956). 
3. 25 Ed.3, st.S, c.4 (1350) ("en due manere ou proces fait sur brief original a Ia 
commune lei"). 
4. Magna Carta§ 39 (1215) ("Nul/us fiber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut dis-
seisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nee super eum ibimus, nee 
super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legum terre.") ("No 
free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled, or in any way 
ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or 
by the law of the land.") (Latin text and translation in J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 326-27 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1965). 
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person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, certain proce-
dures must be observed, procedures designed to ensure fairness.s 
In its English origin, insistence on due process of law-or the law 
of the land-was designed to protect against executive (or judi-
cial) overreaching. 
Six hundred and fifty years after Magna Carta, in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, due process in America had 
become a constitutional limitation on legislative power. No 
longer exclusively concerned with how the executive (or judici-
ary) proceeded, due process developed a concern with what the 
legislature did. Due process had acquired, in other words, a sub-
stantive dimension. United States Supreme Court Justice Sa-
muel Miller had the historical perspective to recognize the 
contrast. In Davidson v. New Orleans6 in 1878 he wrote on be-
half of the Court: 
It is easy to see that when the great barons of England wrung 
from King John, at the point of the sword, the concession that 
neither their lives nor their property should be disposed of by 
the crown, except as provided by the law of the land, they 
meant by "law of the land" the ancient and customary Jaws of 
the English people, or laws enacted by the Parliament of 
which those barons were a controlling element. It was not in 
their minds, therefore, to protect themselves against the enact-
ment of laws by the Parliament of England.7 
But, he continued, the Fourteenth Amendment directed atten-
tion to state action. "[C]an a State make anything due process of 
law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such?"s he 
asked rhetorically, and answered on behalf of his brethren: 
To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the States is of 
no avail, or has no application where the invasion of private 
rights is effected under the forms of State legislation. It seems 
to us that a statute which declares in terms, and without more, 
that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, 
which is now in A, shall be and is hereby vested in B, would, if 
5. John E. Nowak, et al., Constitutional Law 557 (West Publishing Co., 2d ed. 1983) 
("The essential guarantee of the due process clause is that of fairness."). 
6. 96 u.s. 97 (1878). 
7. Id. at 102. Modern scholars have established that it is anachronistic to speak of 
"parliament" as a legislature at the time of Magna Carta. "The word has been traced 
back to Henry Il's reign [1154-89], but it was first used by the chronicler Matthew Paris to 
describe such a meeting [of the great council] in 1239." Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and 
Legal History of Medieval England 413 (Harper and Brothers, 1960). 
8. 96 U.S. at 102. 
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effectual, deprive A of his property without due process of 
law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.9 
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Taking from A and giving to B had become the shorthand to de-
scribe what substantive due process was designed to prevent. 
A similar case of taking from A and giving to B had been 
hypothesized nearly fifty years earlier by Justice Joseph Story in 
Wilkinson v. LelandlO in 1829. In the actual facts of that case, the 
state of Rhode Island had attempted by statute to confirm title to 
Rhode Island real estate. The property had been sold by an exec-
utrix of an insolvent New Hampshire testator pursuant to author-
ity granted by a New Hampshire probate court. Because the 
United States Supreme Court held that the title was valid with-
out regard to the legislation, it did not need to decide the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the statute. In extensive dicta, 
however, Justice Story examined the issue nonetheless. Today, 
perhaps, the question would seem to be one of attempted legisla-
tive revision of a final judicial decision, a violation of separation 
of powers. To Justice Story the question involved an attempted 
taking without due process of law. Any such attempt, he 
thought, would be plainly unconstitutional: "We know of no case, 
in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A to B with-
out his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of 
legislative power in any state in the Union."u 
From its original use to encapsulate what was wrong with 
legislative interference with individual titles, the phrase "taking 
from A and giving to B" became in the heyday of laissez-faire a 
powerful linguistic weapon against regulatory legislation. In its 
notorious 1911 decision in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.,12 invali-
dating New York's pioneering Workmen's Compensation Act, 
the New York Court of Appeals used the phrase to clinch the 
case against the statute under both state and federal constitu-
tions. Describing the statute's "central and controlling feature" 
to be that "the employer is responsible to the employe[ e] for 
every accident in the course of the employment, whether the em-
ployer is at fault or not, and whether the employe[ e] is at fault or 
not," the Court denounced it as "plainly revolutionary."t3 In a 
dubious excursion into legal history, the judges declared: "When 
our Constitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that 
9. ld. 
10. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829). 
11. Id. at 658. This sentence was recently quoted with approval in McDonald's 
Corp. v. Dwyer, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 (N.C. 1994). 
12. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
13. Id. at 436. 
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no man who was without fault or negligence could be held liable 
in damages for injuries sustained by another."14 To change that 
principle by imposing "upon an employer, who has omitted no 
legal duty and has committed no wrong, a liability based solely 
upon a legislative fiat ... is taking the property of A and giving it 
to B, and that cannot be done under our Constitutions."1s 
Scholars often trace the origin of substantive due process to 
Justice Stephen Field's dissent in the 1873 Slaughter-house 
Cases,16 in which he catalogued a series of individual liberties 
supposedly immune from government interference, such as "the 
right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without 
other restraint than such as equally affects all persons."17 Even 
before the United States Supreme Court adopted this proposi-
tion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)1s and-most memorably-in 
Lochner v. New York (1905),19 activist state courts had begun 
turning it into constitutional dogma. In 1885 in the Tenement 
House Cigar Case,zo for example, the New York Court of Ap-
peals invalidated a statute prohibiting the manufacture of cigars 
in tenement houses because it interfered with the profitable use 
of real estate without compensating public benefit. Even earlier, 
as some scholars have noted, a substantive due process compo-
nent had appeared in the infamous Dred Scott Case (1857).21 
Before Slaughterhouse, before the Tenement House Cigar 
Case, even before Dred Scott, the ground was being prepared for 
substantive due process. Because the American constitutional 
requirement of due process was linked to the English constitu-
tional tradition of fundamental law as a restraint on parliamen-
tary power, it had a long history even before it was incorporated 
in American constitutional documents. Sir Edward Coke had 
made a sustained attempt to use the common law to limit Stuart 
absolutism, of which his insistence on due process of law was an 
example. By the time of Sir William Blackstone in the mid-eight-
14. ld. at 439. 
15. Id. at 440. 
16. 83 U.S. 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Con-
tract, 18 Yale L.J. 454, 479 (1909); Bernard Schwartz, The Law in America 104 (American 
Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1974). 
17. 83 U.S. at 97. 
18. 165 u.s. 578 (1897). 
19. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
20. Matter of Application of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). 
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) (Taney, CJ.) (act of 
Congress depriving slaveholders of their property if transported into free states or territo-
ries "could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law"). See Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (Ox-
ford U. Press, 1978). 
1997] SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 341 
eenth century-after the English Civil War and Glorious Revolu-
tion, and on the eve of American independence-the supremacy 
of parliament was firmly established. The test case for Black-
stone, one suggested earlier by Coke, was whether parliament 
could so violate natural justice as to make a man a judge in his 
own case. Coke had taken the negative;22 Blackstone, despite his 
obvious discomfort, took the affirmative: after counseling the 
judges to use every means to avoid finding so manifest a viola-
tion of right and reason, Blackstone candidly admitted: 
[I]f we could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact, 
that he should try as well his own causes as those of other 
persons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent 
of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express 
words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legis-
lature or no.23 
Americans of the Revolutionary generation were, for obvi-
ous reasons, unwilling to concede so much to legislative 
supremacy. Many, Thomas Jefferson among them, preferred 
Coke to Blackstone24 and agreed that no legislature could violate 
natural justice. James Iredell, a precocious theorist of judicial re-
view, wrote in a private letter as late as 1787: 
Without an express Constitution the powers of the Legislature 
would undoubtedly have been absolute (as the Parliament in 
Great Britain is held to be), and any act passed, not inconsis-
tent with natural justice (for the curb is avowed by the judges 
even in England), would have been binding on the people.2s 
A decade later, with an express Constitution in effect and 
Iredell a justice of the United States Supreme Court, he engaged 
with his fellow justice, Samuel Chase, in a celebrated exchange in 
Calder v. Bul/26 concerning a jurisprudence of "natural justice." 
Chase flatly declared that "[a]n ACf of the Legislature (for I 
cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the 
22. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke's Rep. 226, 235 (1610) ("if any act of Par-
liament gives to any to hold, or to have conusans of all manner of pleas arising before him 
within his manor of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he himself is party; for, as hath 
been said, iniquum est aliquem suae rei esse judicem" (it is wrong for a man to be a judge 
in his own case)). 
23. William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 91 (1765). 
24. Julian S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 Ill. L. 
Rev. 629, 637 (1933) (quoting Jefferson as advising law students that "Coke's Institutes 
and reports are their first, and Blackstone their last work, after an intermediate course of 
two or three years"). 
25. Griffith J. McRee, 2 Life and Correspondence of James Iredell172 (D. Appleton 
and Co., 1858) (emphasis in original). 
26. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
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social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legis-
lative authority."21 Iredell in reply denied that judges could be 
guided by so uncertain a rule: "The ideas of natural justice are 
regulated by no fixed standard .... "zs 
Chase, on the contrary, thought the demands of natural jus-
tice not so difficult to discover, and he offered a "few instances": 
A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in 
other words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of 
no existing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful pri-
vate contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his 
own cause; or a law that takes property from A and gives it to 
B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a 
Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be pre-
sumed that they have done it.29 
Of these four examples, the first two were textually ad-
dressed by the "express Constitution": the Ex Post Facto Clause 
(at issue in Calder) forbids laws punishing acts not criminal when 
committed, and the Contracts Clause prohibits laws impairing 
the obligation of contracts. In these cases there was no longer 
any reason to grope for principles of natural justice. It is the last 
two examples-particularly their juxtaposition-that are inter-
esting: "a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause" and "a 
law that takes property from A and gives it to B. ... "3o For 
these, there was no textual counter in the express Constitution. 
But no one familiar with the traditions of English constitutional-
ism-and Americans of the Revolutionary generation had re-
cently been catechized in it-could doubt that making a man a 
judge in his own case violated due process. Coke had said it; 
Blackstone (after his fashion) had repeated it. Indeed, the right 
to an impartial decision-maker remains at the heart of procedural 
due process to this day.3t 
"Taking from A and giving to B" is, however, another mat-
ter. It is here in Calder that it makes its debut in the U.S. Re-
ports. It is difficult to say whether, at this early stage, the 
principal concern is that the taking is without an apparent public 
purpose or without stated compensation. If either of those were 
involved (or, rather, not involved), the textual response would be 
27. I d. at 388. 
28. ld. at 399. 
29. ld. at 388. 
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g .• Nowak et al. at 558 (cited in note 5). See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 
u.s. 245 (1977). 
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the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Time was to reveal 
other concerns, however. Justice Story in Wilkinson v. Leland 
seems to have objected to a legislative attempt to exercise judi-
cial power. To judges in the heyday of substantive due process, 
the problem was legislative interference with beneficial economic 
activity. "Taking from A and giving to B" could accommodate 
all these meanings, which is what made it so useful. 
Students of other bodies of organized knowledge have ob-
served how changing paradigms have triggered relatively rapid 
rearrangements of existing data and opened new areas for exami-
nation. In the history of science, paradigm shifts have accompa-
nied revolutions like Copernicanism and Darwinism.32 Without 
assuming too much similarity between scientific and legal revolu-
tions,33 it is still possible to see the origins of the substantive due 
process revolution in the shifting paradigm used to describe the 
abuse of due process. 
Common law development often takes place out of sight. 
The blatant legal fictions of the past are only the most obvious 
examples. Formal continuity is maintained despite changing real-
ity by pretending new facts fit within old rules. Standard hypo-
thetical cases encapsulating basic principles remain static for 
centuries. On the rare occasions they are displaced, legal change 
may become obvious and rapid. Making a man a judge in his 
own case was the standard illustration of a violation of natural 
justice. It was for centuries (and remains) a prime example of a 
violation of procedural due process. When, in the late eighteenth 
century, it was paralleled as an exemplar (or paradigm) with 
"taking from A and giving to B," there was at first no conscious 
change: this, too, could violate procedural due process, if a judi-
cial proceeding was denied. But under cover of the phrase "tak-
32. See generally, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U. of 
Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1970). As Kuhn himself belatedly recognized, he originally used the 
concept of "paradigm" in two distinct senses: "On the one hand, it stands for the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given 
community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the con-
crete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules 
as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science." Postscript-1969, 
in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 175. The concept is used in this article 
in the second sense. 
33. Although Kuhn himself at one point likened a scientific paradigm to a legal pre-
cedent-"like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further 
articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions," Kuhn, The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions at 23 (cited in note 32)-1 have deliberately refrained from 
emphasizing the simile; first, because with its overtones from the history of science it 
might pr~)Ve distracting; and, second, because Kuhn himself expressed uncertainty about 
how his msight could be exported to other fields, id. at 208-09. 
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ing from A and giving to B" another meaning lurked, 
redistributive and substantive. When in the mid-to-late-nine-
teenth century regulatory legislation threatened vested interests 
and individual entrepreneurship, due process jurisprudence al-
ready contained the germ of a response. "Taking from A and 
giving to B" could do double duty, illustrating both a procedural 
and a substantive violation. As substantive due process emerged 
as a new legal category, "taking from A and giving to B" became 
the prime example of what it forbade. 
The taking paradigm was tied to the use of substantive due 
process in cases concerning economic regulation, so its eclipse as 
a reference point in federal constitutional law was inevitable 
when in the Carolene Products Case34 in 1938 the United States 
Supreme Court announced a general presumption in favor of 
"regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions .... "3s The simple (or simplistic) case of "taking from A 
and giving to B" was of no further use. Such simple paradigms 
had in any event become embarrassments as legal discourse, in-
creasingly influenced by academic legal education, displayed new 
sophistication. But the concept of substantive due process that 
the taking paradigm had helped to midwife did not pass away. It 
remained to see active duty later in a new class of cases concern-
ing claimed violations of individual privacy.36 
Just as Magna Carta's Latin phrase per legem terre ("by the 
law of the land") yielded to Sir Edward Coke's Law French 
translation "due process of law," so the paradigm of what due 
process prohibited enlarged to include not only the procedural 
horror of "making a man a judge in his own case" but also the 
ambiguous one of "taking from A and giving to B." Over time, 
the emphasis in the taking paradigm shifted from denying legisla-
tive determination of individual title (essentially a judicial func-
tion) to denying legislative interference with economic 
enterprise. Once the shift was complete, substantive due process 
had emerged to parallel procedural due process. When substan-
tive due process was eventually abandoned as a check on regula-
tory legislation concerning economic activity, the category was 
not closed altogether; instead, substantive due process was di-
vided into economic substantive due process-now largely inac-
34. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
35. Id. at 152. It was to this sentence that the famous Footnote 4 was appended, 
suggesting the appropriateness of applying a higher degree of judicial scrutiny to legisla-
tion affecting certain types of non-economic activity, such as the exercise of civil rights. 
36. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
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tive-and non-economic (or social) substantive due process, a 
continuing source of constitutional development. 
